19 March 2006

Introduction

In the twentieth century, demand for crude oil and efforts to ensure a steady supply of it, particularly on the part of the West, brought great wealth and strategic prominence to many nations in the region. But it also resulted in much political and social turmoil, and an over-reliance on a single economic commodity. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism beginning in the 1970s can be partly attributed to a backlash against Western political interference and cultural influence.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 contributed greatly to the radicalization of many young Muslims against the non-Islamic powers. When the United States, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued to involve itself heavily in the affairs of the Persian Gulf region, militants committed to waging an armed struggle against American influence coalesced within the al Qaeda terrorist network. This network conducted a series of successful attacks on Western interests culminating in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the continental US, which has resulted in greater American involvement in the region than ever.

Iraq

Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq was characterized by aggression toward his neighbors and arbitrary treatment of his own people. When, in the early 1990s, he led his country into conflict with the US and allied states, the result was defeat, economic sanctions, and compulsive disarmament of NBC weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. However, by 1998 it appeared that the international community was content to let the weapons inspection regime lapse, and to simply contain Iraq. After the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration revived demands that Iraq meet disarmament requirements. The US claimed that Iraq still had prohibited weapons in violation of its commitments to the UN, and expressed its desire to overthrow the Hussein regime. While it was true that Hussein never gave up his goal of ultimately reacquiring some NBC weapons, he did, for tactical reasons, voluntarily destroy his existing stocks during the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, the way in which this was done, combined with his pattern of past behavior, meant that Western intelligence understandably believed he still had those stocks. The Iraqis were unable to satisfy American demands, and the US invaded in March 2003.

It can be argued that the invasion was legitimate, considering that a state of war had existed since 1991. Unfortunately, US policy unfolded in an inconsistent fashion. Iraq was effectively allowed to defy the UN for several years, then was invaded for failing to comply with the UN. This inconsistency and seeming arbitrariness, probably as much as anything else, was responsible for the relative lack of sympathy for the US position in the region and elsewhere. The invasion damaged America’s prestige in the region even more than it was already damaged, and may have increased support for al Qaeda, though information in this regard is hard to come by.

The situation in Iraq is complex and requires analysis of many factors, for which adequate information is often not available. But the broad outlines appear to be as follows: The US, not content with overthrowing Hussein, occupied the country and tried to set up a new political system which would be democratic and would not include Ba'athist participation. Some Iraqis, mostly Sunnis, fought back. They were joined by some Arab foreigners radicalized by the US presence. Soon after the invasion the US decided to disband the army and police and recreate them from scratch, which probably unnecessarily facilitated the efforts of the Sunni rebels and Arab insurgents. What has followed has been a low-intensity insurgency. The US is now working to rebuild the Iraqi state and its security institutions.

Overall, it is likely that most foreign forces will eventually be able to leave Iraq. Indications are that the Iraqi people favor democracy and national peace and unity. The parliament elected in December 2005 appears to be a legitimate reflection of Iraqis' political aspirations. Thus the insurgents do not have much popular support, nor do those who are interested in a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Iraq is a difficult place for a guerrilla force to operate, being largely arid and flat with limited opportunities for bringing in arms and supplies from outside the country's borders. Thus the insurgents have been reduced to terrorist attacks in the cities and towns, which, though they can cause much disruption and suffering, are unlikely to bring about victory. It is only a matter of time before the Iraqi army develops significant capability to operate independently.

Unfortunately, Iraq may never, in its current form, be able to completely provide for its own security without outside assistance. This is not due to the strength of Iraq's enemies, who are relatively weak and in any case are probably largely motivated by the presence of American forces. It is due to the weakness of the government. While Iraqis want peace and unity, sectarian tensions are nevertheless high. If they remain high they may, in the future, sap the vitality of the country's institutions. This, combined with the fact that Iraq is entering uncharted waters with its democratic, Shiite dominated government, means that the political system's long-term viability is very difficult to assess.

The Arab-Israeli conflict

Israel now has peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and the Arab League, at its March 2002 summit, made it seem likely that normal relations with most or all of the Arab countries will become a reality provided that a satisfactory settlement of the Palestinian issue is reached. The conflict with Syria is likely to drag on but can be managed.

The problem is that there appears to be no end in sight to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Considerable progress was made in the 1990s on developing Palestinian institutions. Yasser Arafat’s willingness to negotiate with Israel dominated the Palestinian side while the influence of the militant groups opposed to a political settlement – such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad – appeared to be hopelessly eclipsed. By 2000 however, there were some observers who feared that any breakdown in the talks would lead to a sudden return, by the Palestinians, to serious rebellion against Israel. Unfortunately, by the end of that year, those fears had proved to be well-founded. Miscalculations, insensitivity and short-sightedness on both sides, particularly on the part of Arafat, contributed to the new Palestinian uprising. The militant and terrorist groups have been resurrected in terms of their influence and support. Arafat, upon his death in 2004, was succeeded by Mahmoud Abbas, who was more interested in reaching a political settlement with Israel. But he has not regained the level of power enjoyed by Arafat in the 1990s, and the popularity of his Fatah party has sunk due to a perception by many Palestinians of corruption and poor administration. This led to Hamas's recent electoral victory. While Hamas's victory was primarily due to 'domestic' issues, it also appears that the Palestinian people are ambivalent about reaching a settlement with Israel.

Israel, for its part, has yet to offer the concessions that would be needed to reach a settlement with the Palestinians. The last offer made by the Barak government in 2000 went a considerable way – but not quite far enough – toward the necessary concessions. Now Israelis are less disposed than before to make such concessions. The terrorist attacks which have been carried out by Palestinian militants have played a particularly important role in hardening Israelis’ attitudes toward the Palestinians. It is true that the militant groups have lately adhered to a ceasefire. To some degree this is because of Abbas's efforts. But it is probably due to a greater degree to military setbacks against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The Israelis are aware that they currently really have no one to negotiate with. They seem committed to a policy of 'separation' from the Palestinians, of which the recent withdrawal from Gaza must be seen a part. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians have yet made a strategic decision – as nations – to do what it takes to reach a political settlement.

The Iran-US conflict

A notable casualty of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s was the monarchy in Iran. The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had tried to modernize Iran in an authoritarian way which alienated him from his people. He was a good friend of the US, which had given him considerable assistance in the past. In 1979 he was driven out of the country in what can only be described as a popular revolution led by Shiite Muslim religious leaders, who then established an 'Islamic Republic'. The US allowed Mohammad Reza, who was ill, into the US for medical treatment. An anti-American mob then occupied the US embassy in Tehran and held its staff hostage; the US retaliated through measures including the freezing of Iranian financial assets. The hostages were not released until 1981; among the contributing factors for their release was the fact that Iran was by then at war with Iraq and needed money and spare parts for its military. It agreed to release its remaining hostages in return for the release of its frozen assets.1 The hostage episode outraged the American people. Iran's subsequent support for anti-Israel militants in Lebanon and other hostility toward Israel has ensured a continuing adversarial relationship between Iran and the US.

Part of Mohammad Reza Shah's modernization efforts had been the beginning of a modest nuclear energy program. The Islamic Republic continued these efforts but war and sanctions slowed progress. It was not until the 1990s that the first power plant neared completion. Even as Iran claimed it was not seeking a nuclear weapon, it was engaged in uranium enrichment research that it kept secret from the IAEA. It is unclear whether Iran intended to develop a nuclear weapon or whether it sought mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle so as to have the capability to develop a weapon in the future, and wanted to prevent the US from hindering its efforts.

The research was not a violation of the NPT, but keeping it secret was a violation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. When this came to light in 2003 it greatly increased suspicion in the West – suspicion that was already considerable in the US – that Iran did seek a nuclear weapon. This violation plus other indications since then of Iran's interest in nuclear military applications has enabled the US to gain considerable diplomatic support from other world powers for its demand that Iran give up mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle. However, it is unclear whether there currently is support for coordinated action among the major powers such as economic sanctions against Iran. There is still no concrete evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, and sanctions may have to wait until there is.

Al Qaeda

Islamic fundamentalism, as a social and political movement, continues to grow in strength. This is likely to become most apparent in countries where the existing political system shows itself to be inadequate to meet people’s aspirations. This was seen most dramatically in Iran in 1979. An area of long-term concern is the Arabian peninsula. Most of the countries there are primarily oil-exporters. Their political systems – monarchical – are built on an economic and social order that is both very unusual in the modern world and likely to experience wrenching change as oil reserves become depleted.

In the short term, however, al Qaeda appears to be on the defensive. International cooperation against the terrorist network appears to be going reasonably well, particularly considering the US invasion of Iraq. In Saudi Arabia in particular, the terrorists have had many of their top operatives killed or captured by security forces while managing to inflict only insignificant damage themselves.

North Africa

Libya's renunciation of its NBC weapons programs in late 2003 was an undeniable success for US and British diplomacy. Since the 1990s Mohammar Qaddafi has appeared to be less interested in increasing the power of Libya and more interested in his relations with the West and with developing multilateral initiatives with other African states. Western pressure regarding the NBC programs was probably the straw that broke the camel's back.

For many years Algeria was wracked by a bloody civil war that involved not so much religious or ethnic conflict – though there was some degree of that – as it involved disagreement among the Algerian people about the country’s political direction. The conflict has generally been between a secular establishment backed by the army and an Islamic-based opposition. In recent years the government has pursued, with considerable success, a policy of encouraging rebels to give up their armed struggle in return for amnesty.

Notes

1. Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, Boulder, Westview Press, 1988, p. 352.